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A B S T R A C T
The emergence and expansion of clusters of large metropolitan areas also known as Mega City Regions (MCRs) is a worldwide phenomenon. In China, governmental
attempts are made to develop so-called regional brand identities for them. Regional brand identities, as a subspecies of place brand identities, differ from regional
identities in the sense that they are the result of conscious branding efforts on the part of public authorities rather than more historically evolved regional identities as
experienced by citizens. In this study, the establishment of regional brand identities for three MCRs in China is examined, as these are constituted through and
institutionally embedded in intergovernmental relations. We map the perceptions of national, provincial and municipal governments of regional brand identities
based on planning documents and relevant interviews. The emergence and stabilization of the regional profiles for China's largest MCRs Pearl River Delta (PRD),
Yangtze River Delta (YRD) and Jing-Jin-Ji (JJJ) are featured in their dynamic territorial boundaries, centralized institutionalization and various symbolic meanings.
The national government promotes the regional brands to reinforce the strategic awareness and future direction of the region, and these profiles are diffused at the
provincial and municipal level.
1. Introduction
Large urban conglomerations have emerged in recent decades in
various parts of the world and have by now become a prominent phe-
nomenon in the globalized economy (Brenner, 2002; Florida, Gulden, &
Mellander, 2008). The reasons for this re-scaling of the state are largely
functional in nature in that they were initiated to deal with issues that
cannot be addressed within the geographical hierarchy of existing ter-
ritorial-administrative entities. These new regional entities are expected
to engage with economic growth, infrastructure development and var-
ious strategies for environmental and landscape preservation. As new
regions since the 1970s have typically been planned with the aim to
develop or increase the competitiveness of an area, a shared identity is
crucial to safeguard the functionality and sustainability of new regions
(Castells, 1997).
The rise of such Mega City Regions (MCRs) can be witnessed around
the world, and popular cases can be found in Europe, such as South East
England, the Randstad, Central Belgium and Rhine-Ruhr (Goess, de
Jong, & Meijers, 2016; Hall & Pain, 2006). Similarly in the past two
decades, the emergence of MCRs can also be observed in Asia and Latin
America. In China, Asia's (and the world's) most populous country,
promoting the strength of regions is regarded as an essential strategy to
make its urbanization process manageable and successful (Luo & Shen,
2009; Wu & Zhang, 2007; Yang & Li, 2013). China's MCRs are typical
examples of planned new regions, as their territorial boundaries and the
developmental visions underlying them are defined in planning docu-
ments drafted by the national government. Typical examples are the
three most developed and best-known regions: the Greater Pearl River
Delta (GPRD), the Yangtze River Delta (YRD) and the Jing-Jin-Ji region
(JJJ). All three were actively promoted by the national government and
have been recognized, adapted and adopted in some form by provincial
and municipal governments.
The coining and institutionalization of such denominations for
emerging regions can be considered a form of place branding. A ‘re-
gional brand identity’ refers to an attractive description or shared un-
derstanding of what the region represents as formulated by relevant
government bodies. Governments play an important role in the promo-
tion and coming into being of new regions. A regional brand identity is
different from a regional identity. Most scholars conceptualize the re-
gional identity as consisting of two intertwined dimensions: the identity
of a region and the regional consciousness of its residents (Paasi, 2002).
The former refers to it as a set of natural and cultural assets with given
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bounded spaces in the region, such as landscapes, dialects, local foods
and music (Everett & Aitchison, 2008; Sletto, 2002). The latter refers to
the social collective identification residents have. For the adoption of a
regional brand identity, its regional identity counts as an important
background factor, since it affects the social acceptance of the regional
brand identity among its inhabitants. Current interest in the scale of the
city-region marks a new stage in the rapidly intensifying debate on
regional brand identities since new regions may appear which will also
be far larger in scale (Kavaratzis & Kalandides, 2015; Oliveira, 2015).
Regional brand identities are obviously influenced by the local
context they are embedded in, such as past developments and current
political and administrative concerns. Boisen has illustrated branding
and three types of nonstandard regionalization in the EU. The first type
is metropolitan regionalization, which is driven by the development of
urban agglomerations. The second type featured in specific business
sectors, which is promoted by the growth coalition of public authorities
and private actors. The last one is featured in project-based cross-border
cooperation, which is funded by the supranational government, such as
the EU (Boisen, 2015). Compared with the nonstandard regions in the
EU, the regionalization in China is planned by the national government
and its effective institutionalization occurs through intergovernmental
relations, while private actors are less prominent in this process.
Emergence, acceptance and/or rejection of regional brand identities by
different levels of government depend on relative power positions, re-
sources under their control, interests and problem perceptions, which
can also be found in region branding in other areas (Paasi, 1991;
Zimmerbauer, Suutari, & Saartenoja, 2012). Different governments
throw in their own, often divergent, interests, concepts and targets, and
attempt to mould the regional ‘brand’ in their own ways and all of these
jointly affect the emergence of a new regional brand identity.
This multi-level governance in action can be perceived as a struggle
between desired and more generic brand identities for the region as
initially promoted by the national government and those subsequently
adopted and interpreted by regional/provincial and local/municipal
governments. In this contribution, we examine the interplay of various
tiers of governments in establishing such regional brand identities, how
the narratives of these brand identities across levels compare with each
other and how multi-level governance mechanisms guide the appear-
ance of differential regional brand identities across different regions.
Our study is based on empirical data collected regarding the three
Chinese Mega City Regions mentioned above, but we embed them in
the wider international academic debate and address the global im-
plications of our findings beyond these specific Chinese cases in the
concluding section.
In the rest of this article, we will proceed as follows. In Section 2, we
will theorize how regional brand identities are formulated in the region
building process as multi-level governance theory. In Section 3, we
present our research methodology. Section 4 will offer a brief account
of the territorial, symbolic and institutional shape of three Mega City
Regions in China: GPRD, YRD, and Jing-Jin-Ji. Sections 5, 6, and 7 will
then delve more deeply into the symbolic aspects of these regions and
present the multi-level governance of regional brand identity formation
in these three different MCRs through an analysis of the relevant na-
tional, provincial, and municipal urban plans. Section 8 will compare
the common and differential features across the three regions, highlight
the main insights gleaned on regional brand identity formation through
multi-level governance. Finally, Section 9 will conclude and discuss the
broader theoretical implications beyond these specific regions and
China.
2. Theory: the multi-level governance of regional brand identity
formation
2.1. City and region branding
In the academic literature on place branding, the discussion re-
garding city branding has become relatively elaborate, sophisticated
and comprehensive, but the number of studies about region-branding is
very limited. There are 2017 articles with city brand in their title, ab-
stract or author keywords in the core collection of Web of Science from
2008 to 2018, while only 773 articles published related to regional
brand. Since the boundaries of cities are far easier to draw than those of
regions and they have stronger political visibility, their branding ac-
tivities naturally catch scholarly attention. Moreover, the debate on city
(brand) identity and regional (brand) identity occur in different aca-
demic disciplines. Regional identity is a subject discussed primarily by
scholars in human geography and regional planning; for a long time the
cultural and political aspects dominated in the way regional identities
were studied, with branding aspects barely receiving attention. The
concept regional identity rather referred (and still refers) to the his-
torical and cultural identity of a region and the perceptions residents
have of it (Paasi, 2002). It was only with the rise of new regionalism
that the establishment of regional identities came to be adopted as a
vital instrument in planning and marketing to mobilize human re-
sources to enhance regional competitiveness (Paasi, 2013;
Zimmerbauer, 2011). City marketing and branding emerged as an im-
portant topic in the toolkit of municipal governments already much
earlier, with various scholars in urban planning, marketing, tourism,
and public administration contributing to conceptual development al-
ready from the 1970s onwards (see Table 1). Therefore, with input from
a variety of fields, the constituting elements of city brands were also
refined over time, with city brand identity, city brand position and city
image being distinguished from each other (Anttiroiko, 2014; Chapman
& Lynch, 1962; Kavaratzis & Ashworth, 2005; Wäckerlin, Hoppe,
Warnier, & de Jong, 2019).
The focus on the regional scale in place branding theory originated
in globalization and state-rescaling (Björner, 2006; Messely, Dessein, &
Rogge, 2015). This regionalization process invites new governmental
bodies or private entities in into decision-making on urban develop-
ment and reshapes the existing power relationships. Thus, the main
argument in region branding also covers the change in involved actors,
branding strategies and governance features. In the recent case studies,
Table 1
Differences between region and city brand in the literature.
Region City
Relevant concepts Regional identity (Paasi, 2003; Terlouw, 2012), regional brand
(Oliveira, 2015; Dinnie, 2017); regional image (Zimmerbauer,
2011)
City identity (Kavaratzis & Ashworth, 2005; Kavaratzis & Hatch, 2013), city
image (Chapman & Lynch, 1962; Young & Lever, 1997), city position (Anttiroiko,
2014; Kavaratzis & Ashworth, 2005)
Literature Human geography (van Houtum & Lagendijk, 2001), regional
planning (Paasi, 2009, 2013)
Urban planning and geography (Oliveira, 2015), public administration (Braun,
2008; Eshuis & Edwards, 2012), marketing (Gertner, 2011; Kavaratzis & Hatch,
2013), tourism (Chan & Marafa, 2014), political studies (Anttiroiko, 2014)
Background Globalization, regional rescaling (Deas & Giordano, 2003;
Björner, 2006; Messely et al., 2015)
Globalization, city competition (Van den Berg & Braun, 1999; Boisen, Terlouw,
Groote, & Couwenberg, 2018)
Main governments involved Regional or provincial governments Municipal government
Stakeholder perception The boundaries and understanding of region can be different
according to different parties
The concept of a city and its brands can be relatively clear
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municipal, provincial and/or regional governments, public institutions
and private actors have been found to cooperate in activities to create
an imagined space for residents, visitors or investors (Hospers, 2006;
Witte & Braun, 2015). The national and even supranational government
(such as the EU) are involved in the development of cross-border re-
gions by funding certain projects. The growth coalition of public au-
thorities and private actors can be found in the regions dominated by
specific business sectors (Boisen, 2015).
As for branding strategies, the communication model proposed by
Kavaratzis, which distinguished between primary, secondary and ter-
tiary communications can also be applied in studies on region branding
(Kavaratzis, 2012a, 2012b). The primary communication related to
infrastructure projects and the development of public space take place
some famous cases, such as the Øresund region (Pedersen, 2004). The
secondary communication referring to promotion actions, such as ad-
vertising, public relations can be found in the promotion of logo,
symbol, slogan by local governments or agencies (Augustyn & Florek,
2015). The tertiary communication can be reflected from the evaluation
and feedback from residents or visitors (Martin & Capelli, 2017).
As for governance features, Ind and Bjoerk state that branding
governance is a new management philosophy which goes beyond tra-
ditional brand management (Ind & Bjerke, 2007). This is combined of
the necessity to engage stakeholders in place brand governance and also
serves political, administrative and social function aimed at realizing
public equity (Kavaratzis, 2012a, 2012b). On the other hand, in the
governance of commodification where the marketing philosophy guides
stakeholder involvement focusing primarily on place commodification
(Lucarelli & Giovanardi, 2016). Region branding practices show a
combination of the above two types of governance features with dif-
ferent regions showing different positions on this hybrid spectrum of
governance modes.
From this governance perspective, it is important to note that both
regional or city brand identities are influenced by various governmental
bodies. In most cases, preconditions for branding choices made by
governments at the regional and local levels are formulated in plan
documents established by higher tiers of government which have cer-
tain expectations regarding the role cities and regions have to fulfil
within broader national and provincial contours. The extent to which
these preconditions bind local governments in their choices is nation-
dependent. Some scholars have investigated the formulation of regional
(brand) identities from a planning perspective, but little if any attention
has been paid to the interaction across different levels of government in
this formulation process (Paasi, 2013). Existing work examining the
relationship between city branding and multi-level governance has in-
spired us to dig into the involvement and interaction of various tiers of
government in the formulation process of regional brand identities (Lu,
de Jong, & Chen, 2017; Ye & Björner, 2018).
2.2. The concept ‘regional brand identity’
A region is a space of political governance, where governments play
an important role in creating new spaces of identification and belonging
(Del Biaggio, 2010). In regional building, governments adopt certain
development goals or visions to invite other actors to accept their
concept of the region as the dominant one. These regional development
goals or visions in fact constitute its regional brand identity, which is
promoted by governments in specific time-frames to solve economic
and other problems. Different from regional identities, which evolve
over time and are hard to study because of their political, social, and
even emotional aspects, regional brand identities are often adopted in
planning documents that reveal political intentions.
Place branding of which region branding is an example, is identity-
driven (Boisen, Terlouw, & Gorp, 2011) and aims to match place
identity with place image (Braun, Eshuis, Klijn, & Zenker, 2018). The
identity of a place basically refers to what the place really is, as opposed
to how people perceive it (place image) or want it to be perceived
(brand identity) (Wäckerlin et al., 2019). Distinguishing between re-
gional identity and regional brand identity as done here is not com-
pletely new. As the autonomy of administrative regions has increased,
Terlouw (2009) simplified this terminology by introducing thick and
thin regional identities. A thick identity refers to a traditional culturally
based and historically evolved broad and stable identity fixed to a given
territory. It can serve multiple purposes and is not specifically focused
on problem-solving. A thin identity is a more fluid instrumental identity
focusing on the awareness to solve specific problems (Terlouw, 2009).
Cassinger and Eksell also state that place identity is shaped over time,
while place brand identity is created for strategic and commercial
purposes (Cassinger & Eksell, 2017). Regional brand identity as in-
troduced here largely coincides with the thin regional identity, which is
future-oriented and aims to address economic or social issues. When a
regional brand identity is aligned with regional identity (or a thin
identity with a thick one, for that matter), it is more likely to flourish
and last.
For the governance of regions in China, tasks are distributed across
national, provincial, and municipal governments. Regional brand
identities are consequently constructed through relationships among
these tiers of government. They are open to reinterpretation and may
meet resistance from each of these governments which have potentially
divergent interests (Castells, 1997; Zimmerbauer et al., 2012). In this
contribution, we aim to shed light on the handling of territorial, sym-
bolic, and institutional aspects of region-building and spot possible
varieties in this handling across the three MCRs. Since the involved
governmental bodies are crucial to the recognition and adoption of
regional brand identities, we try to grasp how they are conceived at
different levels of government in the Chinese context. To understand
the acceptance of and resistance to reconceptualized regional brand
identities in multi-level governance systems, we examine the estab-
lishment of the ‘regional brand identity’ in three Chinese Mega City
Regions.
2.3. Regional brand identity formation as multi-level governance
Davis and Reed (2013) have studied the impact of regional identity
and memory on multi-level governance. Different from their approach,
we examine the perceptions of national, provincial and municipal
governments of these brand identities through the narratives in policy
documents describing the Chinese MCRs and the implementation of
infrastructure provision. As regional development is mainly a public
sector matter in China, the input of private actors is insignificant and
not covered here.
Multi-level Governance (MLG) can be defined as political structures
and processes, which aim to cope with interdependencies among ter-
ritorial units in political decision-making (Benz, 2004). MLG can,
however, also refer to negotiated relationships across institutional
boundaries, both vertically and horizontally (Guy Peters & Pierre, 2001;
Hooghe & Marks, 2003). In our contribution to regional brand identity,
we deem it suitable to embrace the former definition and examine just
the intergovernmental relations. The vertical approach in MLG has al-
ready been applied to study urban governance in China, as for the
urban politics of climate change (Liu, Wang, Xie, Mol, & Chen, 2012).
Before 1980, urban sustainability governance in China had been pre-
dominantly top-down, with provincial and municipal governments
merely responsible for implementing national mandates. Although the
national government has preserved its leading role in governance,
provincial and municipal governments have acquired more adminis-
trative and economic power since the fiscal decentralization in 1994.
Also, local governments gradually gained momentum in the process of
reshaping the state (Yang & Wang, 2008; Zhu, 1999).
Since MCRs emerged in the urbanization process in China, the roles
national and provincial governments play in regional governance have
attracted ample academic interest. The insights from scholars can be
summarized as embracing a vertical scaling mechanism, which is
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described as state rescaling (Li, Xu, & Yeh, 2014), upscaling and
downscaling (Li et al., 2014). First, the national government cannot
fully impose its regional vision because economic decision-making has
been decentralized to lower administrative levels (Li & Wu, 2017).
Second, provincial governments and municipalities are relatively in-
dependent administrative units, and they there tend to compete rather
than cooperate (Xu, 2009; Xu & Yeh, 2005). Meanwhile, the national
government strives to fix regional development problems by issuing
spatial plans or establishing institutions in response to a lack of co-
ordination (Wu, 2016). The abovementioned studies on MCRs in China
have provided both theoretical and empirical insight into under-
standing regional governance. Nevertheless, the roles and interactions
of national and provincial governments in regional governance vary
across urban contexts (Li & Wu, 2017; Xu, 2009). In stylized form, the
constitution of regional brand identities in MCRs in China in a multi-
level governance context can be described as follows:
1. The national level government initiates the promotion of certain
regional brand identities in general terms, but their fleshing out
requires active involvement of provincial and local governments.
2. Provincial and municipal governments may accept the suggested
regional brand identity and make use of it in their own develop-
ment. They may also create their own sub-regional brand identities
to position themselves attractively within the proposed region.
3. In the negotiation and redefinition process among the various tiers
of government, the importance they attach to it varies and so does
the meaning they attribute to it.
Some scholars do mention the importance of the multilevel per-
spective in region branding building due to the variegated interests of
actors (Lucarelli & Giovanardi, 2016). As for decision-making across
government levels, our contribution is to our knowledge the first em-
pirical study into regional brand identity formation in a multi-level
governance context.
3. Methodology
This research has adopted three indicators to investigate the evi-
dence of regional brand identities in the Chinese MCRs. The first in-
dicator is the brand identities adopted in the Chinese planning docu-
ments, because the most reliable sources for the data collection on
brand identities and popular names are plan documents rather than
websites or brochures in China (de Jong et al., 2018; Han et al., 2018).
The second indicator is the regional strategies attached to these brand
identities. These regional strategies show how the branding initiative
has been communicated to outsiders, but the implementation may not
occur yet. The third indicator is the implementation of regional stra-
tegies. The infrastructure provision in the Chinese MCRs is selected as
they are a crucial means by Chinese governments to improve regional
integration.
As for the first indicator, since regional brands appear in a complex
intergovernmental context, we first consulted all relevant national
planning documents related to MCR development for establishing the
general position of these MCRs within the national context, followed by
a study of how provincial and municipal governments recognize and
assess these same regions and express positive, neutral or negative at-
titudes in their plans regarding the regions. This approach is among
others suggested by many studies (Hague & Jenkins, 2005; Paasi, 2003;
Raagmaa, 2002). More specifically, we selected plans drafted by the
national, provincial and municipal governments on socio-economic
regional development, all so-called Five Year Plans (FYPs) and Urban
Master Plans (UMPs) drafted and approved after 2010. FYPs reflect
strategic and comprehensive planning for economic and social devel-
opment, whereas UMPs elaborate on the spatial changes in localities.
Additionally, as Hong Kong and Macau do not have FYPs, their strategic
plans are also included in this research to investigate the development
goals at the national level. Since Macau has recently adopted a 13th
FYP in line with mainland practice, we chose its 13th FYP instead of its
strategic plan. An overview of the above is given in Table 2.
At the national level, we examined the national FYPs and UMPs. As
for the provincial plans, we included those drafted by Guangdong,
Hong Kong SAR and Macao SAR (for GPRD), Shanghai, Jiangsu,
Zhejiang and Anhui (for YRD) and Beijing, Tianjin, and Hebei (for JJJ).
When it came to the municipalities, we went through the plans made by
9 PRD cities (excluding Hong Kong and Macau), 15 YRD cities (ex-
cluding Shanghai) and 12 JJJ cities (excluding Beijing and Tianjin). In
all cases, we first made a frequency-count of the region names in the
text. The frequency of region names in the planning documents can
demonstrate the attention and efforts from various levels of government
paid to the MRCs. As counting of regional names demands verification
within the text, we collected the development goals related to regional
names from illustrative sentences or quotes in the urban planning
documents, which demonstrate to what extent they display regional
strategies.
Regarding the second indicator, we have scanned the entire para-
graph wherever “PRD”, “YRD”, “JJJ” appeared, and the relevant brand
identities were coded in terms of their relevance to different aspects of
regional competitiveness, as suggested in Bristow (2010) and Kitson,
Martin, and Tyler (2004). Then, we classified regional brand identities
related to specific policy measures into 16 categories as discerned based
on regional competitiveness literature and the Chinese planning con-
text.1 As for the last indicator, we investigated the high-speed railway
development and the railway density within the regions. The high-
speed railway is one of the major regional infrastructure policy in China
(China Railway Bureau, 2008), the railway density is the length of
railway divided by the size of the regions, which can illustrate the
degree of regional integration from infrastructure provision perspec-
tive.
Whereas document analysis constituted the systematic basis of our
data collection, we used expert interviews to clarify ambiguities found
in planning documents and verify the adequacy of our understanding of
the regional brand identities adopted by different levels of govern-
ments. We interviewed academics, senior planners, and other experts
involved in planning for the GPRD, YRD, and JJJ to dig up additional
insights not found in the official documents. The questions focused on
their understanding of regional brand identities in connection with the
region they were working in their economic significance vis-à-vis other
Table 2
Urban planning documents and key information collected.
Urban planning documents Key information collected
National Five year plan (FYP) and Urban System Plan Key concepts of regional brand identities
Provincial FYP and Urban System Plan Frequency of regional brand identities and the key measures to achieve them
Municipal FYP and Urban Master Plan Frequency of regional names and city positions related to region
1 The regional competitiveness categories in this research include infra-
structure provision, reform and innovation, urban planning, emergency man-
agement, coordination policy, public service, talent policy, entrepreneurship,
legalization, technology development, trust system, management system, cul-
ture development, environmental protection, urban function, and economic
development.
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regions and their broader social and environmental objectives.
Interviews were held in the years 2018–2019 and lasted around 1 h.
The information provided by respondents helped us to detail the
planning process regarding the MCRs and understand the interactions
occurring among different tiers of governments. The transcript of expert
interviews is coded by their understanding of different levels of gov-
ernment's perception of regional brand identity. The list of respondents
can be found in Appendix A1.
4. Territorial, symbolic and institutional shapes of the three MCRs
In our empirical description of the region-building process, we lean
on Paasi (1986). He has argued that a regional identity emerges when
four elements become intertwined and begin reinforcing each other:
territorial shape (definition of borders), symbolic shape (names, con-
cepts and other symbols offering a distinct narrative of the region),
institutional shape (institutions producing/reproducing the territorial
and symbolic shapes) and functional shape (the recognition of regions
as a part of the regional system and broader social consciousness).
Developing regional brand identities can be seen as the process of
creating and naming symbols to express and strengthen the idea of the
existence of a specific region (Paasi, 2009). Regional brand identities
are also related to territorial and institutional shapes in the region
building process, but less to functionality, which is largely beyond the
grasp of public authorities. Below, we will first introduce the territorial
boundaries, generic symbolic conceptualization and institutional evo-
lution of the three MCRs in Section 4. Sections 5, 6 and 7 focus on the
more symbolic features attributed to the three regions in the relevant
plans of the various involved governments and examine the adoption
and moulding of the regional brand identities as reflected in the na-
tional, provincial and local documents, respectively.
4.1. Territorial shape of the regions
The origin of the Greater Pearl River Delta (GPRD), the Yangtze
River Delta (YRD) and the Jing-Jin-Ji region (JJJ) can be found in the
emergence of urban clusters (chengshiqun), as described in studies on
urban systems (Yao, Chan, & Zhu, 1992). Regions evolved around the
development of some mega cities, more particularly Hong Kong,
Shenzhen, Guangzhou, Shanghai, Beijing, and Tianjin (see Fig. 2). As
the surrounding areas near these megacities also developed, the term
Mega-City Region has been adopted by most scholars to describe JJJ,
YRD, and GRPD (Douglass, 2000; Xu & Yeh, 2011; Ye, 2014).
When these regions emerged as clusters of large cities between
which a growing number of functional economic relations evolved, the
national government played a key role in promoting them as economic
regions through issuing regional planning documents to clarify their
functions, targets and spatial plans. The territorial boundaries are sti-
pulated in these spatial planning documents (see Fig. 1).
The territorial boundary of the Greater Pearl River Delta is quite
clear: it consists of nine PRD cities and two Special Administrative
Regions. As for the Yangtze River Delta, it began with Shanghai and
some cities from Jiangsu and Zhejiang Province. The territorial
boundaries were redefined in the Yangtze River Delta Regional Plan is-
sued by the State Council in 2010, including eight cities from Jiangsu
Province and seven from Zhejiang Province. In 2016, in the Yangtze
River Delta Mega City Region Plan, the area of Yangtze River Delta was
enlarged to include nine cities from Jiangsu, eight cities from Zhejiang
and eight cities from Anhui Province (see the left blank in the YRD
Fig. 2). However, in the academic discussion, the borders of YRD tend
to vary, and some scholars even include all the cities in Anhui, Jiangsu,
Zhejiang, and Shanghai (Interviewee 3, Shanghai, 2019).
In the Jing-Jin-Ji mega city region, the concept of the Capital
Economy Circle was used in 2010, which covers Beijing, Tianjin, and 11
cities from Hebei Province. In the Beijing, Tianjin and Hebei Synergy
Development Outline in 2015, the coverage of JJJ remains the same.
From other planning documents, Anyang from Henan province, Datong
from Shanxi Province and Dezhou from Shandong Province are also
mentioned in the JJJ (see the left blank in the JJJ Fig. 2). The en-
vironmental plan for JJJ region even covers 26 cities, including some
cities in Shandong and Liaoning (Environmental Protection Ministry,
2017). The ambiguous territorial boundaries demonstrate that JJJ's
development is still in its early stages compared with that in the other
two regions.
4.2. Symbolic shape of the regions
Among the three regions, the GPRD clearly has the longest history,
but it still demands higher-level intervention because of the variety of
political and administrative systems involved. In contrast, the YPD has
advanced the most, since it has experienced the failure of its in-
stitutionalization imposed in a top-down manner, and its subsequent re-
constitution organized by municipal and provincial governments in a
bottom-up fashion (Li & Wu, 2017). Compared with the former two, the
institutionalization of the JJJ is still in the early stages.
The growth of the Pearl River Delta (PRD) cannot be seen apart from
the roles that Hong Kong and Macau have played (Bie, de Jong, &
Derudder, 2015). During the economic reform in the 1980s, Shenzhen
Special Economic Zone was established as an experimental area to
transfer Hong Kong's capitalist free market economy to mainland China.
Zhuhai Special Economic Zone was established later as Macau's coun-
terpart. The PRD area soon became the biggest national manufacturing
base. The concept of the PRD Economic Zone was first introduced by
Guangdong's provincial government in 1994, and it tended to empha-
size the integrated development of the nine mainland cities in it.
The rise of the Yangtze River Delta is highly connected with that of
Shanghai. The concept originated from the establishment of the
Shanghai Economic Zone in 1982, which promoted coordinated eco-
nomic development among several cities in Zhejiang province, Jiangsu
province and Shanghai. Shanghai and the YRD entered a period of rapid
development in the 1990s. Pudong New District was established in 1992
as Shanghai's Special Economic Zone, and it benefited greatly from
national policies. Evolving into an international financial and trade
hub, Shanghai remained the YRD's economic engine. In 2008, YRD
cooperation even became a national strategy, as indicated in the issuing
of Guidance for Promoting YRD Reform and Opening Up, Economic and
Social Development by the State Council.
Jing-Jin-Ji is located around the Bohai Rim in the northern part of
China. It is the national capital region and famous for its heavy in-
dustrial base, called Jing-Jin-Tang (formed by Beijing, Tianjin, and
Tangshan). The concept Jing-Jin-Ji (JJJ) was first coined in the 1980s,
but it took on a life of its own in 2004, when the two province-level
cities, Beijing and Tianjin, joined forces with Hebei province and signed
a Closer Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) for the Bohai Rim.
Two years after the agreement the National DRC specified the concept
of economic integration for the JJJ and began to formulate a
Comprehensive Plan for the JJJ Metropolitan Region. The promotion of
national policies and institutional establishment is presented through
the key historical events of three regions in the next section.
4.3. Institutional shape of the regions
4.3.1. Greater Pearl River Delta
Much of the interaction between the PRD, Hong Kong, and Macau is
economic in nature. Since the 1980s, manufacturing industries in Hong
Kong and Macau have relocated to the PRD which enjoys lower land
prices and labor costs. The turning point for this region was the es-
tablishment of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR)
on 1 July 1997. Hong Kong's reunification with mainland China fuelled
the expectations and plans in Guangdong to promote the economic
integration of the PRD and Hong Kong. The Hong Kong and Guangdong
Cooperation Joint Conference was established in 1998 (Fig. 2). The idea
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of a Greater PRD was proposed immediately after the reunification of
Macau to mainland China in 1999. In the same year, Macau returned to
China, and the Macau Special Administrative Region (MSAR) was es-
tablished. Two years later, in 2001, a Guangdong and Macao high-level
meeting system was founded.
In 2002, the concept of the Greater PRD was officially adopted by
the HKSAR government. However, a really significant milestone was
the signing of the Mainland and Hong Kong Closer Economic Partnership
Agreement (CEPA) in 2003 by the national and HKSAR governments
(Cheung, 2015). This agreement aimed to counter the national gov-
ernment's prioritization of the development of Shanghai and the
Yangtze River Delta in the 1990s, which had significantly slowed down
that of the PRD.
In 2008, the Pearl River Delta Development and Reform Outline was
approved by the national government, which mentioned the coopera-
tion between Guangdong province, Hong Kong, and Macau at the na-
tional level. Meanwhile, Hong Kong suffered from the financial crisis,
and the economic connection with the mainland became crucial. In the
period 2006–2009, the Guangdong, HKSAR and MSAR governments
first jointly conducted a Planning Study of the Coordinated Development of
the Greater Pearl River Delta Townships, which brought up the concept of
a ‘bay area’ development.
In the last two decades, the GDP growth of the PRD cities has re-
mained around 10%, while Guangzhou and Shenzhen grew increasingly
international, and they also aspired to the status of a global city, leading
to some concern in Hong Kong about its competitive international
status. Finally, the ‘Outline of Development Plan for Guangdong-Hong
Kong-Macau Greater Bay Area’ was released by the State Council in
February 2019. It showed the determination of the national government
to promote this concept, despite the plan becoming controversial under
the ‘one nation two systems policy’ and raising debates among Hong
Kong's public.
4.3.2. Yangtze River Delta
In 1983, a coordination organization, the Shanghai Economic Zone
Planning Office was established by the national government, with the
mission to explore alternatives for the problems resulting from the
sector-dominated economic development (see Fig. 3). However, the
Fig. 1. The location of the Greater Pearl River Delta, Jing-Jin-Ji and the Yangzi River Delta (the expansion of the regions is left blank in each region).
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organization lacked efficiency and hierarchical control, and it was
abolished in 1988 with the suggestion to establish a Provincial Gov-
ernor Joint Conference.
The economic connection between Shanghai, Jiangsu, and Zhejiang
provinces has intensified since the late 1980s. The engineers and
technicians in the state-owned enterprises in Shanghai worked part-
time on weekends in the factories in Jiangsu and Zhejiang. The tech-
nological transfer from Shanghai played an important role in the in-
dustrial development of these two provinces. In 1992, 13 cities from all
three provinces, including Shanghai, Nanjing, Suzhou, and Hangzhou,
founded the Yangtze River Delta Urban Economic Coordinated Committee.
This was the first regionally coordinated and bottom-up initiated or-
ganization, nonetheless adopting similar concepts as the national gov-
ernment had done before. In 2001, Shanghai, Jiangsu, and Zhejiang
province established the Shanghai, Jiangsu, and Zhejiang Economic
Cooperation and Development Forum, of which the respective vice-
provincial governors were in charge. In 2004, it was lifted to the level of
main leaders and became the highest decision-making group at the
provincial level.
In the 2000s, Shanghai still remained the leading city in the region,
and the economic growth in Zhejiang and Jiangsu proved stable. The
national government considered making use of spillover effects to boost
the surrounding areas. In, 2009, Anhui was also invited to attend the
governor's forum of Shanghai, Jiangsu and Zhejiang Provinces and the
Yangtze River Delta Urban Economic Coordinated Joint Conference. By
2010, the number of members in the YRD Coordination Committee had
risen to 22, including some cities from Anhui province. Furthermore,
the national government finally formulated the Yangtze River Delta
Urban Agglomeration Development Plan in 2016, in which Shanghai and
25 cities from Zhejiang, Jiangsu, and Anhui formed a powerful alliance
aiming to compete with the world's most developed urban agglomera-
tions.2 Meanwhile, Anhui is interested in attracting companies re-
locating from Shanghai, Jiangsu, and Zhejiang.
4.3.3. Jing-Jin-Ji
In 2014, the JJJ Coordination Development Leadership Team Office
was established. After this, Beijing, Tianjin, and Hebei province also
established corresponding offices to facilitate the operations of the JJJ
Coordination Development Leadership Team Office (see Fig. 4). In
2015, the Beijing, Tianjin, and Hebei Synergy Development Outline was
issued by the national government. Nevertheless, although the im-
portance of the JJJ concept was repeatedly emphasized, the regional
disparity is wider, and the integration tasks accordingly tougher com-
pared with the GPRD and YRD regions. It suffers from poor collabora-
tion among cities and the widest GDP gap between the core city Beijing
and peripheral cities in Hebei. Acknowledging the deteriorating posi-
tion of Hebei province, the national government unexpectedly drafted
the plan of Xiongan New District in April 2017, which was located in
Fig. 2. Milestone events in the history of the Greater Pearl River Delta.
Fig. 3. Milestone events in the history of the Yangtze River Delta.
2 Although 25 cities from Zhejiang, Jiangsu and Anhui province coordinated
with Shanghai in the Yangtze River Delta Urban Agglomeration Development
Plan (2016), this research focuses on the original 15 cities, which are far more
connected with each other.
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Hebei province with roughly the same distance to Beijing and Tianjin. It
was the first new district directly issued by the State Council (China's
national government) and considered the most important planning
event after Shenzhen in the 1980s and Pudong in the 1990s.
The recognition and adoption of the ‘brand identities’ attached to
these regions among national, provincial, and municipal governments
are now examined in Sections 5, 6 and 7, respectively.
5. Regional brand identities for the MCRs: the national
perspective
In this section, the symbolic dimension of the three MCRs which
cuts at the heart of their regional brand identities, is examined in the
plan documents of the national government. Regional cooperation has
been a key national policy to improve China's global competitiveness
for over a decade (Interviewee 7, Shenzhen, 2017). The growing at-
tention paid to regional development at the national level can be found
in the strategic regional plans, National FYPs as well as Urban System
Plans (see Tables 6 and 7). These show both in the increasing frequency
by which regions are mentioned and how the national government sets
developmental targets for them. PRD, YRD and JJJ are all approved as
important regions and can be traced back to Deng Xiaoping's policy to
“develop some regions to be wealthy first”. From the perspective of the
national government, the MCRs should take the lead in and be the
exemplar for other city regions in China (Interviewee 7, Shenzhen,
2017; and interviewee 2, Shanghai, 2017). The national government
has created new concepts for them, such as the Guangdong-Hong Kong-
Macau Greater Bay Area, the Yangtze River Economic Belt and the
Bohai Rim Economic Belt, depending on their regional economic and
political contexts.
5.1. Greater Pearl River Delta
The PRD, as a region aimed to be a hub for advanced manufacturing
and service industries, is widely embraced in the Outline of the Pearl
River Delta Reform and Development Plan 2008. The study in 2004 fur-
ther added the PRD aiming to be a cultural centre and high-quality
living circle (Table 3). In the Outline of the Great Bay Development Plan
(2019), the attention of the national government has evolved towards a
first-class bay area including closer links among PRD cities as well as
broader cooperation with Hong Kong and Macau, hence reinforcing the
importance of concepts such as the Greater PRD and the Greater Bay
Area (see Table 4). The concept of the Greater Bay Area is important for
the national government since it includes the symbolically crucial tasks
to promote the integration of two Special Administrative Regions, Hong
Kong, and Macau, within the Chinese planning system. HKSAR and
MSAR still enjoy highly independent administrative powers, but the
national government tends to get actively involved through regional
identity formulation, as can be seen in the Greater Bay Area Cooperation
Mechanism signed in 2017 by the national government, Guangdong
Provincial, HKSAR and MSAR governments (Interviewee 7, Shenzhen,
2017).
5.2. Yangtze River Delta
From the perspective of the national government, the YRD is now
the most developed MCR in China, also having the most influential
cooperation among its cities (interviewee 1, Shanghai, 2017; inter-
viewee 5, by phone, 2017). Like the PRD, the YRD is also to become a
hub for modern service industries and advanced manufacturing in the
YRD Regional Plan in 2016. Moreover, the YRD also set a few more
specific goals, including the most active resource allocation centre and
technologically innovative high ground with global influence (see
Table 4). The YRD is expected to lead in the development of the Yangtze
River Economic Belt (raised by the national government in 2015, re-
ferring to the provinces located upstream of the Yangtze River). The
national government has paid less attention to the YRD in recent years
because the economic integration evolved more easily given the re-
lative equality in wealth among the various cities (unlike in the JJJ)
and the absence of thorny political issues (such as in the GPRD).
5.3. Jing-Jin-Ji
The term Jing-Jin-Ji can be found both in the 12th and 13th na-
tional FYPs. The term Capital Economic Circle was coined in 2010 to
focus on the urban agglomeration surrounding capital city Beijing. This
concept still appeared in the 12th FYP, but it disappeared in the 13th
FYP (see Table 3). The national government's attention had shifted to
Fig. 4. Milestone events in the history of the Jing-Jin-Ji region.
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the transfer of ‘non-capital functions’ from Beijing to other areas within
the JJJ region. With Beijing suffering from severe environmental pol-
lution and an overly crowded urban area, JJJ came to be regarded as
the region that could relieve it from much of this ecological and po-
pulation pressure. Therefore, the national government mentioned the
demonstration area of ecological restoration and improvement as the
target of JJJ in its Coordinated Development Plan. Becoming a world-
class urban metropolitan region and the new economic growth engine
of national innovation were also targets for JJJ formulated by the na-
tional government. Compared with the other two regions, its main goal
was to offload pressure from Beijing to Hebei Province, while nar-
rowing the developmental gap between Beijing and Hebei seemed of
lesser importance (Interviewee 11, Beijing, 2017). The national inten-
tion behind this promotion of MCRs is to relieve their megacities from
extreme population growth and funnel it to subordinate cities in the
regions around them.
From the above development targets for the region in the planning
documents issued by national governments, economic development,
environmental protection, and urban function tend to be keywords. The
national government adopted economic development as a crucial ele-
ment in the regional brand identities for all three regions, such as the
financial cooperation area (PRD) and globally competitive economic
zone (YRD). The dominant focus of the national government is still
international competitiveness, while regional imbalance is de-empha-
sized (interviews 11 and 12). When it comes to policy measures re-
quired to implement the brands, the national government emphasized
infrastructure provision for the three regions in the 12th FYP, while
boosting innovation was more often mentioned (especially for the PRD
and the JJJ) in the 13th FYP.
6. Regional brand identities for the MCRs: the provincial
perspectives
Since the planning system in China is such that the national plan
documents have their exact equivalents at lower government tiers
(provincial and municipal), we will present the provincial Five-Year
Plans and Urban Systems Plans in terms of the three MCRs in Section 6.
The (Greater) Pearl River Delta appears in plans drafted and adopted by
the Guangdong provincial government and the Hong Kong and Macau
SARs. The Yangtze River Delta appears in plans developed by the
Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang and Anhui provincial governments. Jing-
Jin-Ji is dealt with by the Beijing, Tianjin and Hebei provincial gov-
ernments.
6.1. Greater Pearl River Delta
Guangdong and Hong Kong are the key actors in promoting regional
integration in the GPRD (Interviewee 8, Guangzhou, 2017; interviewee
10, Shenzhen, 2017). In the 1990s, Guangdong was the leading area in
China's ‘Opening Up policy’. After Pudong became a national new dis-
trict in 1992, the Yangtze River Delta developed tremendously fast,
which made Guangdong anxious to keep its leading position in the
national economy. In 1994, Guangdong Province actively began
striving for regional integration with Hong Kong. In 2008, the PRD
Development and Reform Outline offered an important chance for
Guangdong Province to gain support from the national government to
speed up the region's development. The term PRD appears around a
hundred times and GPRD a few times in its 12th FYP, its 13th FYP, and
Urban System Plan (see Table 5). The term Guangdong-Hong Kong-
Macau Greater Bay Area appears for the first time in Guangdong's 13th
FYP.
Until 2003, Hong Kong had hardly responded to initiatives for re-
gional integration with the mainland. However, the growing economic
pressure since China's joining the WTO became a crucial factor in the
changing relationship between Hong Kong and the mainland (Yeung,
2010). Its negative attitude changed gradually, and both PRD and
GPRD were mentioned in the Hong Kong Policy Addresses of 2011 and
2016, as well as in its conceptual plan. Hong Kong even recognized the
need to find synergy through co-operation and coordination as the
“super-connector” for the mainland in its Policy Address 2016. Con-
sidering the rise of Shenzhen and Guangzhou (interviewee 9,
Guangzhou, 2017), it admitted the PRD region as a multi-centred city
region and itself as “an integral part” of this region in the HK2030
Conceptual Plan.
The role played by Macau is less significant, simply because of its
limited economic scale and regional influence. It relies heavily on
Table 3
Regional names mentioned in key national planning documents.
Region 12th FYP 13th FYP Urban System Plan
GPRD PRD (2) Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macau Greater Bay Area (1), PRD (4), GPRD (1) PRD (37)
YRD YRD (2) YRD (4), Yangtze River Economic Belt (3) YRD (36)
JJJ JJJ (2)
Capital Economic Circle (1)
Transfer non-capital functions from Beijing (4), Bohai Rim (4), JJJ (5) JJJ (19)
Table 4
Regional development goals of the three MCRs in key national planning documents.
Regions Development targets
GPRD Economic centre, advanced manufacture, modern service industry base, international gateway (Outline of the Pearl River Delta Reform and Development Plan 2008)
World-class urban agglomeration, cultural centre, high quality living circle (A Study on Coordinated Development Planning of Urban Agglomeration in the Pearl River
Delta 2004–2020)
Vibrant world-class urban agglomeration; international technology innovation centre with global influence; the important support for the Belt and Road policy;
cooperation demonstration zone for the mainland; Hong Kong and Macao; a quality living circle (Outline of the Great Bay Development Plan 2019)
YRD The most active resource allocation centre, the technologically innovative high ground with global influence, the globally important modern service industry and
advanced manufacturing centre, the important international portals in the Asia Pacific region, the leader in a new round of reform and opening up, the Demonstration
Zone of Beautiful China Construction (YRD Regional Plan, 2016)
JJJ A world-class urban metropolitan region, the reform leading area of regional coordinated development, the new economic growth engine of national innovation, the
demonstration area of ecological restoration and improvement (JJJ Coordinated Development Plan, 2015)
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resources from the mainland and wishes to cooperate with the main-
land to diversify its industrial structure. Macau mentioned the PRD
more than Hong Kong in its Policy Address 2011–2012 and is closer to
the national government by acknowledging that the cooperation be-
tween the PRD and the MSAR is a national strategy. Being aware of the
benefits derived from the regional cooperation, Macau specifically
mentioned the disadvantage of its highly limited land resources and the
possibility to cooperate with its mainland neighbour Zhuhai in making
use of the latter's land.
Regarding regional brand identities, Guangdong Province empha-
sized economic development in both its 12th and 13th FYPs (see Fig. 5).
The provincial government also paid increasing attention to environ-
mental protection. As for specific measures, Guangdong Province, Hong
Kong, Macao all focus on infrastructure provision, which can be ex-
plained by the construction of high-speed railways within the PRD cities
and to Hong Kong, and Hong Kong-Macau-Zhuhai Bridge in the 2010s
(interviewee 3, Shanghai, 2017). The emphasis on the infrastructure
provision in PRD also implies that constructing mega-infrastructure
projects is an effective regional integration strategy (of the central
government) when governmental and institutional cooperation is dif-
ficult to achieve.
Until 2019, nine cities in the PRD have been linked to high-speed
railway networks. The Hong Kong-Zhuhai-Macao Bridge was open to
the public in 2018, and the high-speed railway between Hong Kong and
the mainland finished construction and used by residents in 2019.
Although the policy process did not evolve smoothly, the im-
plementation of these projects demonstrates that the regional brand
identity has been promoted by further infrastructure provision. Within
the mainland, the railway density in the nine cities is low with three
cities even having no railways in, 2009 (at the end of 12th FYP).
However, the railway density in the PRD nine cities has reached
0.06 km/km2, which is the highest among the three MCRs in 2016 (at
the beginning of 13th FYP). The fast implementation of railway net-
works also underlines the progress made in region brand identity for-
mulation.
In the PRD, the (G)PRD as regional brand identity was promoted as
a regional brand and symbol of unity by Guangdong province when it
perceived that the national government had shifted its attention to the
YRD. The brand identity of the (G)PRD enjoyed only weak recognition
from Hong Kong for a long time. It admitted to its relevance only re-
cently, when it sensed its reliance on the mainland was on the increase.
Acceptance of the GPRD by Macau has always been strong, but less
weighty given its small size.
6.2. Yangtze River Delta
Shanghai has long had a leading role in the YRD region (interviewee
1, Shanghai, 2017; interviewee 3, Shanghai, 2017). As a gate for in-
ternational business and the nation's prime financial hub, Shanghai
identifies itself as the core of the Yangtze River Delta. Aiming to de-
velop into a world-class urban agglomeration, in its 13th FYP Shanghai
developed its own regional concept of the Grand Shanghai Metropolitan
Economic Circle (see Table 6). This concept emphasized synergetic co-
operation with three cities in Jiangsu (Suzhou, Wuxi, Nantong) and
three in Zhejiang (Ningbo, Jiaxing, Zhoushan). However, the political
clout behind it was not nearly as great as that of the Jing-Jin-Ji and the
Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macau Greater Bay Area (GPRD).
Regional names for the YRD at the provincial level are sketchier and
more varied. For example, Zhejiang province introduced the sub-brand
identity Hangzhou Bay Area, which is featured in its electronic commerce
and information economics (see Table 6), which consisted of 7 cities
including Shanghai, Jiaxing, Hangzhou, Ningbo, Zhoushan, as a coun-
terpart to the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macau Greater Bay Area. Though
the sub-brand identity Hangzhou Bay is not new and harks back to the
Zhejiang Hangzhou Bay Industrial Belt Development Plan in 2003, it re-
mains a generic concept and is far from mature (interviewee 4, byTa
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phone, 2017). Jiangsu province also seems to juggle with a variety of
regional synergetic brand identities. In its 13th FYP, we find two
equivalent sub-region names, the Nanjing metropolitan circle, and Su-
Xi-Chang (Suzhou, Wuxi, Changzhou) urban agglomeration, which is
characterized by advanced manufacturing and service industry (see
Table 6). On the one hand, Su-Xi-Chang urban agglomeration has built
a close relationship with Shanghai and enjoys well-developed manu-
facturing base. The close relationship between Su-Xi-Chang and
Shanghai is built upon interprovincial rather than intra-provincial in-
tercity cooperation and synergy.
Anhui, YRD's newest member, is obviously the least connected with
Shanghai and its emphasis on regional strategy is weaker (interviewee
6, Shanghai, 2017). In its 13th FYP and Urban System Plan, the Wanbei
urban agglomeration (located in northern Anhui province) and Hefei
capital metropolitan circle come to the fore (see Table 6). Little is said
in the way of interprovincial cooperation. In short, though the YRD has
well-developed networks for inter-city cooperation in the manu-
facturing industry and urban development, these networks are founded
on cities rather than provinces. Even after the publication of the YRD
Urban Agglomeration Development Plan in 2016, the regional names
adopted by different administrative entities are fuzzy and show sub-
stantial overlap.
Compared with the frequency of JJJ and PRD in their corresponding
administrative entities, the provincial level governments in the YRD
adopted a smaller number of regional brand identities in their planning
documents (see Fig. 6). Moreover, the focus and attention from the
provincial level entities also vary. Shanghai adopted more regional
brand identities than other provinces, which revolve around infra-
structure provision in its 12th FYP, while attention extends to co-
ordination across policy areas in the 13th FYP.
As for infrastructure provision, the earliest high-speed railway
constructed in 2010, and the total number of high-speed railways
reached 20 in 2019, linking most cities in Jiangsu, Zhejiang and Anhui.
The railway density in the YRD increased from 0.02 km/km2 in, 2009 to
0.043 km/km2 in 2016 (when Anhui was also included in the YRD). The
increase in railway density also shows the progress made in regional
integration by infrastructure provision.
In sum, provinces located in the YRD all show firm recognition of
the YRD as an entity, and are eager to symbolically construct their own
regional sub-brand identities within it, such as Shanghai (the Grand
Shanghai Metropolitan Economic Circle), Jiangsu (Su-Xi-Chang urban
agglomeration), Zhejiang (Hangzhou Bay Area) and Anhui (Wanbei
Urban Agglomeration). To some extent, one may assume that regional
brand YRD being less explicitly mentioned and more often creatively
used implies actually that it is now deeply ingrained in the region.
6.3. Jing-Jin-Ji
In Beijing's 13th FYP, JJJ is mentioned 80 times and recognized as a
world-class urban agglomeration with Beijing as its capital city (see
Table 7). A specific strategy of synergetic development is to transfer Beijing's
non-capital functions to the areas around Beijing by getting rid of the
undesirable industries to decrease the pressure from overpopulation,
congestion, and pollution. A similar picture emerges in its Beijing Master
Plan 2004–2020: Beijing has promoted the development of a metropolitan
region around itself for a long time. It adopted concepts like “the nation
serving the capital” and “the outside province protecting Beijing”, which
demonstrates special value attached to Beijing, even at the expense of
areas outside the capital (Interviewee 11, Beijing, 2017). Promoting re-
gional integration for Beijing is more about deepening its cooperation with
Tianjin (interviewee 13, Beijing, 2017).
Tianjin's contribution to JJJ's regional integration has been limited
in recent decades (Interviewee 12, Beijing, 2019; Interviewee 13,
Beijing, 2017). Following national economic policies, many state-
owned enterprises have historically been relocated to Tianjin. Tianjin
mentions JJJ 21 times in its 13th FYP (see Table 7), and stated that it
will actively participate in JJJ's integration process. In fact, Tianjin
primarily focuses on building a closer relationship with Beijing within
the JJJ framework and on promoting its industrial upgrade to advanced
manufacturing and services. In the JJJ synergetic strategy of the Tianjin
Master Plan 2005–2020, the emphasis is the development of the Binhai
New District where Tianjin's deepwater port is located.
Neither Beijing nor Tianjin deems JJJ coordination very important,
presumably because they already have long-established strong political
and economic positions as the development poles in the region.
However, Hebei has long been known as providing cheap labor for
Beijing and Tianjin, and it has become one of the biggest national steel
production bases and polluted regions in China (Wei, Liao, & Fan,
2007). Accordingly, Hebei's aspiration to turn JJJ's synergetic devel-
opment into a success appears from the far more elaborate texts and
detailed strategies in its 13th FYP: JJJ is mentioned no less than 79
times (see Table 7).
Beijing mentioned it infrequently in its 12th FYP, but the numbers
go up significantly in the 13th FYP, especially when it comes to policy
coordination and environmental protection (see Fig. 7). In terms of
regional coordination and environmental protection, JJJ somehow
performed the worst of the three MCRs. Also, Beijing focuses more on
environmental protection because this has become an urgent wish of
the urban elites in the nation's capital. As for Tianjin and Hebei, they
also began to focus on JJJ, and their attention covers many aspects of
regional development. Hebei, with one of the worst living environments
Fig. 5. Regional strategies related to brand identities about the PRD in Guangdong, Hong Kong and Macau 2011–2015 and 2016–2020.
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of the nation, did not emphasize environmental protection at all in its
12th FYP, and only three times in its 13th FYP. As the weakest eco-
nomic and political actor in the JJJ, accepting the undesirable heavily-
polluting industries from Beijing is the only developing option for
Hebei, as it emphasizes economic development, infrastructure provision
and coordination policy in the 13th FYP.
At the end of 2019, Beijing, Tianjin and all the prefecture-level cities
in Hebei have been linked by high-speed railways. The railway density
in the JJJ has increased from 0.014 km/km2 in, 2009 to 0.026 km/km2
in 2016, which is the lowest among the three MCRs. The low railway
density is also evidence of the fact that the implementation of the JJJ
regional brand identity still requires more efforts.
In short, Beijing, Tianjin, and Hebei all mention JJJ in their plans.
Beijing sees it as a receptacle where the capital's unwanted functions
can be transferred and Tianjin as an axis to Beijing where its industrial
profile can be upgraded. Hebei province recognizes JJJ as one offering
economic opportunities derived from regional integration, and little is
said about accepting the residual functions from and a subservient role
vis-à-vis Beijing and Tianjin. Structural inequalities in this region are
consequently symbolically reflected in conceptualizations and narra-
tives reflecting these inequalities.
7. Regional brand identities for the MCRs: the municipal
perspectives
This section presents the adoption and remoulding of the MCRs in
the planning documents drafted by the various municipalities located in
the three regions. We will follow the same order as in Sections 4–6.
However, since Hong Kong, Macau, Shanghai, Beijing, and Tianjin
operate at the provincial level rather than at the municipal level, these
administrative bodies will not show up here. Overall, we see a growing
frequency among most cities in making reference to regional brands to
increase the competitiveness of cities located within their respective
regions. How this is done and how important regional symbolic names
are to them, depends on their relative importance within this region.
The more important the city is, the less important the region seems to
be for this city.
7.1. Greater Pearl River Delta
The PRD as a concept is adopted by all nine cities in the region (see
Fig. 8). The GPRD, however, is mentioned less often in their 12th and
13th FYPs and Urban Master Plans. Most but not all cities see a rise in
their reference to the PRD in their 13th FYP in comparison with the
12th FYP. Among them, Guangzhou and Shenzhen appear not to
identify themselves much with either PRD or GPRD; they consider
themselves as the national front-runners and aim to be international
cities rather than to be part of a regional entity (Interviewee 7,
Shenzhen, 2017). As for the other cities, Dongguan and Huizhou both
aim to be regional “central city” in the PRD, whereas the others only
mention themselves as central cities on the west bank of the PRD
(Jiangmen and Zhongshan), or as “manufacturing base” of the PRD
(Zhaoqing). As for the railway density of the mainland nine cities, an
increase can be seen in Shenzhen, Guangzhou, and Dongguan. From
this perspective, Dongguan can be regarded as a regional centre (see
Fig. 9).
7.2. Yangtze River Delta
In the YRD region, all cities have pitched their urban development
in line with the brand identities of the YRD. The keyword “YRD” is the
most prominent in the 12th FYP plan, and municipalities have begun
mentioning the Yangtze River Economic Belt in the 13th FYP, a policy
that has newly emerged and is now attracting growing attention among
relevant governments and aims to supplement the YRD rather than to
replace it (see Fig. 7). Most cities indicate their positions as being thatTa
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of “centre city” (Wuxi, Suzhou, Zhenjiang and Hangzhou) or “important
city” (Ningbo) in the YRD region, or as having the specific functions of
an “advanced manufacturing base and eco city” in the YRD (Nanjing).
As for the cities located at the fringes of the region, they either em-
phasize their connection functions, such as “regional hub city” con-
necting east and west, south and north (Changzhou) or relate them-
selves to the YRD to only a limited extent (Zhoushan). As for the
railway density in the YRD, Shanghai and Nanjing have a high density,
while Hangzhou lags behind as a provincial capital.
7.3. Jing-Jin-Ji
All cities adopt the JJJ concept in their urban planning documents
in this region. The keyword “JJJ” is the most prominent in the 13th FYP
plans (see Fig. 8). 11 out of 12 cities even claim to be part of it in key
sentences in their plans (except Anyang). Most of them adopt the terms
Jing-Jin-Ji, but Bohai Rim and Capital Economic Zone also appear.
There is an increase in their use of the term JJJ in their 13th FYP (as
compared with the 12th FYP), which is indicative of their efforts to
pursue this developmental opportunity. These cities indicate their po-
sitions as “important city or node” in JJJ (Shijiazhuang, Cangzhou,
Langfang). As an important city in Jing-Jin-Tang's industrial base,
Tangshan aims to maintain its historical position as the “centre city” in
the Bohai Rim, and as a “pivot city” in the Capital Economic Zone.
Nonetheless, the regional name JJJ appears less strong in other cities,
and they also mention other regions or provinces as being of key im-
portance to them. As for the railway density in the JJJ, Beijing and
Tianjin dominates the top ranking and the other cities lag behind,
which also reflects the disparity within the region.
8. Discussion
In this contribution, we focused our attention on the phenomenon
‘regional brand identity’. Distinct from ‘regional identity’, brand iden-
tities may be not derived from past heritage or commonly felt cultural
characteristics, but they tend to be instrumental, follow economic ob-
jectives and are co-created by various tiers of government. Since newly
emerging regions normally cross provincial and city borders and are of
national importance, they are used by national, provincial and local
governments alike for functional reasons, but these various bodies may
see these functions and symbolic features differently, depending on
their interests and perspectives. Since little is known about the for-
mulation and evolution of regional brand identities (in contra-
distinction to city brand identities), the chapters above have explored
the emergence of regional brand identities for three Mega City Regions
in China in the interplay across various tiers of government. We ana-
lysed which territorial, symbolic and institutional shapes these regions
acquired over time and then focused on the symbolic representation of
each of these three MCRs by involved governments across the various
administrative levels.
Their territorial shape of the regions occasionally shifted over time,
mostly towards expansion by incorporating new peripheral cities within
the region. While the shape of the GPRD has remained stable over time,
that of the YRD expanded substantially, and that of JJJ still shows a
tendency to fluctuate but it is definitely growing. Compared with the
regions in the EU, the scale of Chinese MRCs is decided by national
government policy rather than bottom up within the urban agglom-
eration as most EU cases. The institutional shape of the three MCRs
strengthened over the years through the establishment of coordination
committees and organs, reshufflings of administrative entities, the
proclamation of zones and the official adoption of regional plans.
Institutional shapes have been successfully adopted in all three regions.
The symbolic shape of the region appears to be predominantly that of
being an economic growth pole allowing the Chinese national state to
compete with similar MCRs around the world. In addition to that, the
GPRD is also a political integration project between China's mainland
and Hong Kong and Macau. The significance of JJJ is to offer Beijing
the greater geographic content to thrive in as the nation's political and
technological capital.
All three MCRs have progressed considerably, with the YRD being
apparently furthest advanced. The YRD region has existed the longest
and has the least deep divide among the involved provinces and cities in
terms of wealth and income disparity. Only latecomer Anhui province's
adherence has very recently changed its territorial shape. The PRD is
also firmly established; but the gap in prosperity is wider than in the
YRD and the inclusion of two separate Special Administrative Regions
Hong Kong and Macau (of which the former has not always been an
eager partner) has made integration harder, especially institutionally.
JJJ has traditionally been far less strong than the other two but has
recently received a great push from the national government which has
placed it firmly on the agenda of various involved governments. The
steps taken in their territorial delimitation, symbolic conceptualization
and narration, and institutional stabilization can be seen as a process of
multi-level governance in which different government tiers throw in
their own interests and agendas.
In the national plans, the regional strategies of the three MCRs enjoy
solid support. They are invariably seen as economic zones with inter-
national competitiveness and/or world-class urban agglomerations that
should be able to compete with other similar international MCRs. On
the provincial level, the general adoption of the respective MCR brand
Fig. 6. Regional strategies related to brand identities about the YRD in Shanghai, Zhejiang and Jiangsu 2011–2015 and 2016–2020.
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identity is equally strong across the three regions, but it is presumably
most institutionally fragmented in the GPRD. In the PRD, the brand
identity of (G)PRD was promoted as a symbolic shape by Guangdong
province when it perceived that the national government had shifted its
attention to the YRD. The brand identity of the (G)PRD had enjoyed
only weak recognition from Hong Kong for a long time. In fact, it ad-
mitted to its relevance only recently, when it sensed its reliance on the
mainland was on the increase. Acceptance of the GPRD by Macau has
always been strong, but less weighty given its small size. In contrast,
provinces located in the YRD all show firm recognition of the YRD as an
entity, and are eager to symbolically construe their own regional sub-
brand identity within it, such as Shanghai (the Grand Shanghai
Metropolitan Economic Circle), Jiangsu (Su-Xi-Chang urban agglom-
eration), Zhejiang (Hangzhou Bay Area), Anhui (Wanbei Urban
Agglomeration). These sub-brands also reflect the importance of spe-
cific industries in regions, such as in the Su-Xi-Chang urban agglom-
eration (advanced manufacturing and service industry), and the
Hangzhou Bay Area (electronic commerce and information economics),
where they operate like driving forces and inspire government actors.
Finally, Beijing, Tianjin and Hebei all mention the JJJ in their urban
plans. Beijing sees it as a receptacle where the capital's unwanted
functions can be transferred to and Tianjin as an axis to Beijing where
its industrial profile can be upgraded. Hebei province recognizes the JJJ
as offering economic opportunities derived from regional integration,
and little is said about accepting the residual functions from and a
subservient role vis-à-vis Beijing and Tianjin. Structural inequalities in
this region are consequently symbolically reflected in a con-
ceptualization and narratives reflecting these inequalities.
At the municipal level, the region's names are often mentioned, but
their meaning depends on the geographic, economic and political po-
sitions occupied by the various cities. Across the board, more pros-
perous and powerful municipalities rarely mention the regional brand
identities. They tend to attach less importance to the region they are
located in and rather consider themselves international cities in direct
competition with their peers elsewhere, while the smaller and less
prosperous ones adherent more to and depend more on the region they
find themselves in.
9. Conclusion and implications
Regional brand identities are fluid and instrumental. In the Chinese
context, they are instigated by the national government to strengthen
the potential to address primarily economic questions. In this con-
tribution, we have shown that in China's multi-level governance system,
the national government promotes the regional brand identities as
economic zones for their international competitiveness and world-class
urban agglomerations that should be able to vie with other similar in-
ternational MCRs. Moreover, the territorial borders of the regions are
decided by the national government. Compared with MCRs in the EU,
the national government plays a more important role in the Chinese
cases and tends to establish scale and direction from the top down,
while lower tiers of government throw in their own stakes and ideas,
but within the range of options left to them by the national government.
These brand identities are not always in line with historical or cultural
regional identities, although coherence between identity and brand
identity would probably make broad acceptance of the latter easier
(Terlouw, 2009), which also reflects the governance towards place
marketing rather than public equity (Lucarelli & Giovanardi, 2016). In
sum, the regional brand identity is also like a package including every
element, which is vague for provincial and municipal governments.
At the provincial and municipal levels, the functional assumptions
under the selected regional brand identity are not called into question,
but remoulded to fit their own economic interests. These findings are
consistent with the attitudes of provinces and cities to regional identity
in the Finnish context to the extent that Finnish provinces and cities
struggling with their economic status or development tend to adhereTa
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more to and depend more on regional brand identities proposed for
them and promoted by the Finnish national government (Paasi, 2013).
However, successful and economic core provinces or cities do not look
up to national level for direction in the same way. The sub-brands
proposed by provincial and municipal governments also reflect the
driving forces from specific industries rather than the national gov-
ernment.
This begs the question to what extent experiences in multi-level
governance of regional brand identities in Chinese regions reflect
broader international patterns. It is tempting to assume that the finding
of the dominant position of the national government, as well as the
sequentiality in the process (from national through provincial to mu-
nicipal) and systematicity of representation (brands reflected and
comparatively easily retrieved in plan documents), do not hold for
many other nations. Transferability is possible to countries with a
strong national government where megacities evolving into MCRs. As
China has a systematic planning system, which many developing
countries do not have, the involvement of multiple levels of govern-
ments will be the same, but the interaction among them, as well as
private actors, will always remain specific to national institutional
conditions. As residents' perception is an important dimension for re-
gional brand identity study, future studies can further investigate the
role and perception of residents in the branding process.
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Appendix A
Table A1
Interviewees from planning and research institutes in three megacity regions.
Respondent's host organization Respondent's position
1 Shanghai Urban Planning and Design Research Institute Planner involved in Shanghai 2040
2 Shanghai Social Science Academy Researcher working on coordination within the Yangtze River Delta
3 Shanghai Social Science Academy Researcher working on regional governance in Yangtze River Delta
4 Zhejiang Province Land Survey Planning Institute Researcher working on regional development
5 Nanjing Provincial Land Survey Bureau Planner working on YRD regional planning
6 Tongji University Professor working on Yangtze River Delta development
7 Peking University Shenzhen Graduate School Professor studying and involved in Greater Pearl River Delta development
8 Guangdong Urban & Rural Planning and Design Institute Chief planner involved in the planning at Guangdong and Guangzhou levels
9 Guangzhou Urban Planning and Survey Design Research Institute Chief planner involved in the planning at Guangdong and Guangzhou levels
10 Planning & Design Institute of Peking University (Shenzhen) Co. Ltd Chief consultant involved in the coordination of GPRD, especially with Macau and Zhuhai
11 China Academy of Urban Planning & Design Shenzhen Chief planner involved in the Jing-Jin-Ji Coordination Plan
12 China Academy of Urban Planning & Design Beijing Planner involved in the Jing-Jin-Ji Coordination Plan
13 Tsinghua University Professor working on Jing-Jin-Ji Coordination
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